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Abstract: While the Enlightenment promoted thinking for oneself independent 
of religious authority, the ‘Endarkenment’ (Millgram 2015) concerns deference to 
a new authority: the specialist, a hyperspecializer. Non-specialists need to defer to 
such authorities as they are unable to understand their reasoning.  Millgram 
describes how humans are capable of being serial hyperspecializers, able to move 
from one specialism to another. We support the basic thrust of Millgram’s 
position, and seek to articulate how the core idea is deployed in very different 
ways in relation to extremely different philosophical areas.  We attend to the issue 
of the degree of isolation of different specialists and we urge greater emphasis on 
parallel hyperspecialization, which describes how different specialisms can be 
embodied in one person at one time.  
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1. Specialization and the Great Endarkenment 
It is a commonplace, in the academy but also at large, that there are specialists for seemingly 
everything. A notable early form of specialization outside the academy is Henry Ford’s 
automobile ‘assembly line’ where different workers each perform their own specialist task.  
Contemporary research scientists, by contrast, have become very narrowly focused in a rather 
different way, one that relies on a complex network of theoretical knowledge.  That narrowness 
of focus is in stark contrast with scientists of the Enlightenment, such as Newton, who were 
expected to have a broad knowledge of the science of the time.  A quick inspection of recent 
PhD topics and titles of articles in contemporary leading scientific journals will show that the 
work is not going to be read or understood by someone with a passing interest in the area. 
Specialists are the target audience. 
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Of course, experts in specialist fields also have knowledge and skills in other areas, which allows 
them to navigate the modern world of mobile phone plans, tax returns, social media, car 
insurance and so forth.  But, in those areas, the knowledge and skills are not concentrated in the 
hands of a few in the same way.  A different case is where a single person is a specialist in more 
than one field, a point to which we shall return.  
 
When we receive opinions and advice from a specialist outside of our area of knowledge, we find 
that we cannot absorb their detailed explanations.  The vocabulary experts employ, even in cases 
where it echoes an ordinary language term, is generally inaccessible to the non-expert.  On 
occasion, we may not even know which kind of specialist to consult for a particular problem.  
Suppose that we want to assess the structural integrity of Auckland’s Sky Tower and the tower’s 
ability to withstand an 8.5 magnitude earthquake.  We do not know whether a geophysicist, a 
structural engineer, or a geologist would be best suited to evaluate the tower’s robustness.  
Moreover, we may not be in a position to distinguish the genuine expert from the fraud.  For 
that kind of judgment, we must appreciate the nuances of the expert’s thinking and justification 
for making an assertion about the integrity of the Sky Tower’s structure.   
 
In The Great Endarkenment (2015), Elijah Millgram works with the theme of specialization and 
develops some radical views about the nature of knowledge and the human mind, which he links 
to a new philosophical methodology. We believe his work is extremely fruitful, and we wish to 
articulate some main themes with our commentary and even at one point to extend the ideas. As 
Millgram (2015, 22) explains, a central feature of the Enlightenment was an emphasis on 
thinking for oneself, in particular in the way that science can discover new knowledge without 
needing to defer to religious authority. Throughout the broad sweep of the Enlightenment there 
were many thinkers, such as Daniel Bernoulli, Leonardo DaVinci, and Leonhard Euler, who 
didn’t focus on just one particular area but were led by their insatiable curiosity into a wide array 
of scientific problems and mathematical paradoxes.  The title of Millgram’s volume is a play on 
the idea that, with extreme specialization, we, in a way, must once more defer to authority, the 
authority of the specialist, since we cannot be privy to the wisdom of a specialism outside our 
own area (Millgram 2015, 28).  Chapters in the volume, seven of which have been revised from 
earlier published work, address this and related themes.  Millgram’s volume contains a rich 
network of intersecting themes supported by a complex array of arguments and, of necessity, we 
must keep a narrow focus.  In what follows, we shall endeavor to draw out that theme of 
hyperspecialization from across a few chapters, with a particular focus on serial 
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hyperspecialization, and develop some reactions to it.  We then turn our attention to the sibling 
notion of parallel hyperspecialization, something scarcely mentioned by Millgram, and wish to 
make a case for its importance in a way that is complementary to serial specialization. 
 
2. Hyperspecialization 
In the process of developing his central theme, Millgram introduces the term 
‘hyperspecialization’, which is an extreme form of specialization. 
 
[S]pecialization is far more highly articulated than at any time in previous human history, 
and because this difference in degree has come to amount to a difference in kind, I’ll 
mark the newly extreme form of division of labor with the label hyperspecialization. 
(Millgram 2015, 2) 
 
In many places, the references to hyperspecialization occur in an academic context and indeed it 
is a commonplace that disciplines have become subdivided into successively narrower 
disciplines.  Millgram applies the notion of hyperspecialization beyond a narrowly academic 
setting, though, for example to the expertise associated with an occupation or profession and, as 
we shall see, more broadly still.   
 
The extreme form of specialization that interests Millgram arises out of the proprietary nature of 
communication had between experts, people who narrowly focus upon one area or topic and 
who have cultivated that specialty over a number of years.  Modern life forces society to 
construct some extreme, narrowly focused concepts.1  Petroleum engineers communicate well 
with other petroleum engineers, but such individuals have a difficult time communicating with 
geologists and geophysicists, despite there being clear connections between their areas of 
expertise.  Even at a more mundane level, we cannot function with just a single set of widely 
held concepts, for many aspects of life that a person may or may not need to deal with, such as 
preparing a tax return or engaging with Facebook, require a grasp of the appropriate specialist 
notions.   The point of philosophical interest emerges when one specialist is so tied to their own 
                                               
1Arguments for the replacement of analytic philosophy’s current stewardship of the conceptual realm 
with something more fine-grained and nuanced are found in Ruth Garrett Millikan’s views 
involving unicepts (2017, 42-55) and Mark Wilson’s conception of the prevailing approach as 
“dressing every concept in common khaki” (2006, 13). An early, and too often overlooked, 
expositor, of views such as those discussed in Millgram, Millikan, and Wilson is Meir Buzaglo 
(2002). 
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notions and methods that there is mutual incomprehensibility with a specialist in another area, 
even a closely related area.  While one can grasp the gist of the overall thesis, it is a feature of 
Millgram’s volume that the examples and explanations of the nature of hyperspecialization 
change from context to context, a feature consistent with the overall orientation and 
methodology employed, as we shall discuss in a moment.  The basic idea extends a lot further 
than we may first suspect.2 
 
 
3. Serial Hyperspecialization 
 While there is no doubt that human beings tend to specialize, or arguably hyperspecialize, in one 
narrowly conceived area, it is notable that some human beings, with some effort, are able to pass 
from one area of interest or specialization to another. Millgram discusses this idea in relation to 
hyperspecialization. He writes: 
 
[People] work their way into any one of an apparently open-ended list of disciplines or 
professions, and what is more, they are able to switch from one to another -- although 
because the costs of doing so are high, these migrations do not happen very many times 
over the course of a life. Thus someone might (real example) start out as a dancer, then 
work for an architecture firm specializing in theater design, then for an IT department, 
and subsequently become a vice-president of a bank. (Millgram 2015, 6) 
 
On Millgram’s account, this real example marks a particular kind of hyperspecialization: it’s serial 
hyperspecialization. Clearly, the serial hyperspecializer is someone who can move from one 
specialist domain to another by acquiring new knowledge and skills.  Millgram thinks it is a 
significant characteristic of humans that we are capable of making such transitions, while other 
species such as bees or ants have fixed specialist roles.  It is part of the evolutionary heritage of 
humanity that we have the capacity to move to a new specialty.    
 
One thing a person needs to acquire in a move to a new specialty is a new vocabulary.  Millgram 
acknowledges that new vocabularies “are not always scientific or academic vocabularies: a while 
back, I was up on my roof, talking to a roofer, and I literally could not understand what he was 
                                               
2 We could cast a sociological eye on the nature of these specialist groups in science and 
elsewhere: how they are formed, how membership is regulated and so forth.  That is not the 
main driver for Millgram, though, as he is more interested in the way that specialist concepts are 
shared only narrowly and what it shows about how the minds of the specialists work. 
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telling me” (Millgram 2015, 148).  This is a rare occasion of intellectual humility in a 
philosopher’s work.  Millgram, a Harvard trained philosopher, couldn’t understand the 
vocabulary of a tradesman.  Moreover, he admits, the vocabularies are just ‘the tip of this 
iceberg’. “Serial hyperspecializers develop systems of standards, priorities, and guidelines that 
frame decision and choice within particular disciplines” (Millgram 2015, 148).  The example of 
the roofer brings out the way that this whole approach and way of thinking can apply to choices 
of a very practical nature, which may involve practical skills.     
 
While this example may make us think of an old school roofer who acts alone, we should 
remember that participation in a specialism implies the existence of a group of specialists.  
Membership of a specialist community supports fruitful interactions and common standards and 
practices.  This is part and parcel of the notion of specialization as Millgram understands it.  
When he focuses on specifically serial hyperspecialization, he focuses on the cognitive and 
professional journey of a single individual, for he is looking at how one person can migrate from 
one specialization to another. But, of course, that journey presupposes the existence of distinct 
communities of specialists, communities that support internal interaction but cannot foster proper 
communication with members of other communities of specialists. The base level sociological 
fact is that modern human societies organize themselves into relatively discrete specialist 
communities.  Millgram’s thesis of serial hyperspecialization adds to that fact the potential of 
individual people to navigate their way between those communities. 
 
Serial hyperspecialization is a central theme of Chapter 10: Segmented Agency.  The central idea is 
that the progress of an individual from one specialization to another demonstrates how there is 
no unified agent over time.  The chapter employs an example that transports us from the lot of 
the academic into the arena of social and political change.  A Jewish philosopher in 1930s 
Germany has been accustomed to making decisions on the basis of some well-established 
policies: “accepting the advice of his Doktorvarter, not making life choices on the basis of 
outlandish rumors, and not letting politics impinge on career decisions” (Millgram 2015, 246).  
Those principles were central to him as an agent.  But the increasing anti-Semitic policies of the 
Nazis turn his whole world upside down.  In order to survive and function, he needs to 
completely abandon those principles that were central to his agency and adopt a whole new way 
of thinking.  For Millgram, this shows that agency is segmented, in that there is no single agent 
that persists through the transition.  This example reinforces the point that hyperspecialization, 
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and indeed serial hyperspecialization, are not simply features of the nature of scientific 
knowledge, in Millgram’s view.  We need to apply those notions differently in this context. 
 
4. Millgram’s Methodology 
If the thesis of hyperspecialization were true, it would have implications for how philosophers 
should go about their work.  Where philosophers are focusing on the very theme of 
hyperspecialization, and how it plays out in different contexts, they face the difficulty that they 
need to delve into different areas of knowledge and activity for which a specialist is required.  At 
least, one would need to proceed in a piecemeal fashion, which is precisely how Millgram 
describes his approach in this volume.  Really one would need a diverse team with different areas 
of specialist knowledge (see Millgram 2015, 278-9) but, in order to show the new way, it is 
reasonable for a single author to delve into various topics as best he can.  The eclectic structure 
of the volume thus reflects the themes under discussion.  Moreover, the volume is taken to 
illustrate a certain philosophical methodology.  The methodological innovation is referred to 
relatively briefly in Chapter 1: Introductory Remarks on the Tower of Babel, is taken up in the body of 
the volume, as discussed below in relation to chapters 6 and 8, and is returned to, again briefly, in 
the concluding Chapter 11: Afterword: A Call to Arms.  The best test of the approach, though, is 
the way the method is put into effect in relation to various topics in the different chapters.  
  
One methodological approach Millgram very clearly opposes is the classic technique of analytic 
philosophy that takes key concepts from ordinary language, such as ‘know’, ‘true’ and ‘ought’ and 
subjects them to careful analysis.3  This relies on the semantics of our ordinary language 
capturing a folk wisdom that has been refined over the ages (Millgram 2015, 12).  This approach 
will not work in a world in which a serial hyperspecializer needs to readjust the whole basis of 
her thinking, including the concepts at its core, in adapting to new circumstances.  As well as 
considering the journey of the individual hyperspecializer, we need to consider how a society or 
group as a whole can shift to a new setting based on different concepts as well as different 
standards, priorities, and guidelines for action.  Therefore, on this approach, there are no eternal 
truths that a philosopher can discover by conceptual analysis. 
 
We have already emphasized how the central notion of hyperspecialization can be realized 
differently in different settings.  Indeed, it is a consequence of the new methodology, itself 
                                               
3 One is reminded here of Mark Wilson’s (2006; 2017) distinction between stewards and custodians 
of the conceptual realm. 
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prompted by the theme of hyperspecialization, that there will be no definitive analysis of the 
notion of hyperspecialization.  The methodology grounded in hyperspecialization tells us not to 
expect a unitary concept of hyperspecialization.  So, when different chapters give us rather 
different realizations of hyperspecialization, that is precisely what we should expect!  Millgram 
provides some useful guidance about how to conduct philosophical enquiry when he talks of 
metaphysics as intellectual ergonomics (Millgram 2015, 13).4  Metaphysics should be about the design of 
intellectual devices that make reasoning and inference about the world in which we find 
ourselves tractable and effective, a cognitive-function analysis.  As the practical, scientific, and 
social settings vary, so will the nature of those intellectual devices.  
 
5. Applications to Value Theory 
We should look at some particular examples of how the main themes in the volume are 
developed.  Earlier we mentioned that hyperspecialists form groups with internal social 
coordination, although the innovator will often start out alone.  The kind of group we are talking 
about can vary significantly, though, as becomes clear when we look at the application of the 
theme of hyperspecialization to morality.     Here we need to take a broad view of 
hyperspecialization, which takes us well beyond groups based on academic specializations. There 
are four chapters in the volume that relate in some way to value theory, but let us focus initially 
on Chapter 9: Applied Ethics, Moral Skepticism, and Reasons with Expiration Dates, which considers 
philosophy’s lack of success in answering the fundamental question of moral psychology, “Why 
be moral?”   
 
Millgram’s explanation for that lack of success is that we have been making the mistake of 
seeking definitive refutations of moral skepticism.5  We will do better if we look for temporary 
reasons, ones that come with expiration dates.  That makes sense if we see moral values located 
in a particular social niche so that, as society changes, so does the morality that governs it.  
Moving from one social niche to another with different moral imperatives can be viewed as akin 
to moving from one area of specialization to another, but rather than an academic or 
professional discipline’s standards we are now considering a way of living that has its own needs, 
ways and standards.  Even so, Millgram still tends to reach for examples that relate to some kind 
of professional knowledge and practice.  Thus he says that “to a certain kind of old-fashioned 
                                               
4 Millgram has previously addressed metaphysics as intellectual ergonomics in his (2009a, 217-
222). 
5 Elsewhere Millgram has explored similar arguments in print (2009b) and in an as yet 
unpublished work, “Refuting Skepticism with Style” (2018).  
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military man” the answer to the question “Why be moral?” is that morality is honorable while to 
the contemporary business practitioner the answer is that it is good business practice (Millgram 
2015, 226).  In those different contexts, morality regulates our interactions with each other in 
different ways.   
 
Chapter 6: Why Do We Think There Are Things We Ought to Do? showcases Millgram’s method of 
cognitive-function analysis over traditional semantic analysis.  The focus here is on the action-
guiding character of ‘ought’ statements, initially on moral ought statements, but extending to 
ought statements more generally.  The kind of basic moral statements that are considered in a 
variety of moral theories (moral realism, moral intuitionism, and absolutism) as just “a matter of 
brute, metaphysical fact” (Millgram 2015, 128) can be regarded as a simplified distillation of the 
outcome of more nuanced and complex reasoning.  Millgram believes that the defeasibility of 
conclusions is a feature of practical inference more generally.  For example, in means-ends 
inference if you desire the end then you desire the means (you want cash and the nearby ATM 
provides the means) but the concluding action of operating the ATM is defeasible, for “a shady 
character may be lurking around the site” (Millgram 2015, 132).  The point is that attending to a 
variety of defeasibility conditions adds a significant cognitive load.  To say that you ought to do 
something can be understood as saying there is a good argument for doing so, allowing that the 
full argument can involve an indefinite number of qualifications.  The cognitive function of 
ought statements is to provide action guidance in economical form.  He connects this with his 
thesis of hyperspecialization.  We have no access to, and indeed could not comprehend, the 
arguments that the specialist would use to justify a recommendation.  The ought statement from 
the specialist marks “support, while screening that support off” (Millgram 2015, 153).  Again, we 
see how the thinking behind hyperspecialization extends beyond academic and professional 
disciplines. 
 
6. Applications to Necessity 
Let us now consider another, rather different, context to which the notion of hyperspecialization 
can apply.  Chapter 8: Progressive Necessity addresses the question: what is the cognitive function of 
necessity?  This is another example of how Millgram approaches metaphysics as intellectual 
ergonomics.6   The widespread use of modal notions in everyday and specialist context suggests 
                                               
6 One should also consult Millgram’s (2009a) where he has outlined similar arguments in Chapter 
10: “The Lewis Twist: Mind Over Matter,” Chapter 11: “Bare Necessities,” and Chapter 12: 
“Metaphysics as Intellectual Ergonomics.” 
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they play a role in our thinking, a role we should uncover.  Necessities as such are unobservable 
and uncovering their role is made more difficult by the way modal notions present themselves to 
us in misleading ways.  Specifically, the natural understanding of necessities is that they are 
unconditional and eternal but Millgram argues that necessity is progressive, for necessities are 
located within particular theories and mind-sets in particular domains and particular times and 
places.  We are not speaking from some kind of notional ‘end of science’ perspective, à la C.S. 
Peirce. The claim of progressiveness is that, in general, the set of necessary truths tends to grow 
over time.  The process of accumulating necessities is not always a smooth one, however, as 
branches of enquiry from time to time are abandoned as ill-founded.  This will occur in Kuhnian 
scientific revolutions, which may require innovators to pay attention to what the established 
theory declares impossible (cf. Kuhn 1962). 
 
For Millgram, “necessity is a way of telling people what not to think about” (Millgram 2015, 
199). A modern understanding of physics allows us to ignore patent applications for perpetual 
motion machines, for such things are impossible (Millgram 2015, 198). To lead into his position 
he describes a more primitive species, which he labels “Piltdown Man,” that can adopt a 
specialization early in life but cannot adapt to a new specialization.  A Piltdown Man is not able 
to even contemplate how things could have been otherwise.  From that point of view, what is 
impossible by the tenets and standards of the specialization is not even considered.  We might 
say those impossibilities cannot even be thought, which makes us think of the linguistic reform 
of “newspeak” described in George Orwell (1949), something designed to control and limit 
thought. Clearly this takes us on to difficult, though well-trodden, paths concerning the 
relationship between language and thought (See Sapir (1921) and Whorf (1956)) or indeed in the 
Philosophy of Science such as in Hung (2006), where languages involve category systems, which 
function as theories.   
 
Let us focus, however, on Millgram’s views about the function of necessity in human cognition. 
When a serial hyperspecializer enters a new niche, she does not know at first what to attend to 
and what to ignore and the necessities she learns provide that guidance.  Thus the function of 
necessity is to serve as an attention management device.  Necessities indeed can convey more 
generally to those outside the specialization what should be ignored.  There is a question as to 
what function necessities play for a serial hyperspecializer currently well embedded in a particular 
specialization and communicating with her peers.  Not being a Piltdown Man she can 
contemplate those necessities but they are endorsed as second nature, perhaps like the way the 
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true believer in a religion can rehearse its tenets without hint of question.  We can observe that 
hyperspecialization enters in this account of the function of necessity in a subtle and rather 
unexpected way. 
 
Millgram’s conception of humans as serial hyperspecializers should not lead us to think that all 
humans are equally versatile.  Many humans are more like the notional Piltdown man than we 
would like to think. As automation, including forms based on artificial intelligence, invades the 
workforce, we find workers may be too inflexibly tied to skills that are now redundant.  While a 
changing economy will create new jobs, which in effect require the acquisition of new 
specializations, not all workers are sufficiently like the idealized serial hyperspecializers to be able 
to adapt to them. Amongst humans, there is a spectrum of ability to move between 
specializations and the picture of the well-educated, multi-talented, adaptable person, which is 
useful for Millgram’s exposition, captures one end of that spectrum.  In fact, ironically, a 
distinguished hyperspecializer may in effect be stuck in their area of expertise.  Think of Bobby 
Fischer who was a supreme specialist in Chess but who did not appear able to employ his 
extreme intelligence to achieve success in another sphere (Brady 2011). 
 
Millgram has little time for modal logic as capturing metaphysical truths about the structure of 
possible worlds.  As explained, he does not think that there are eternal truths about necessity but 
rather local practices of attention rationing.  In Chapter 7, Lewis’s Epicycles, Possible Worlds, and 
Modality, the topic is also modality, but here with an emphasis on counterfactuals, which Lewis 
famously handles by way of comparative similarity among worlds.  In brief, “If Ann had come to 
the party it would have been lots of fun” is true on this approach if in the closest worlds to ours 
in which Ann came it was lots of fun.  We are not considering those less close worlds in which, 
say, Ann came with Donald Trump.  This chapter does not make explicit reference to 
hyperspecialization but it is not hard to recognize some related thinking.   
 
According to Millgram, Lewis seeks some global ordering of similarity among worlds, but 
Millgram argues, plausibly, that our modal intuitions that support counterfactuals are tied to 
specific problem areas or topics (Millgram 2015, 179).  In fact, Lewis does allow for context 
dependence in the interpretation of counterfactuals, which needs to be reflected in judgements 
of similarity among worlds (Lewis 1973; 1979: 457).  Such context dependence brings us back to 
the thinking around specialization.  Just as different specialists have different ways of 
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understanding what is going on in a certain situation, so they also will arrive at different 
judgements as to what possible worlds are most similar to the actual one. 
 
7. Does Millgram’s Approach Have Limitations? 
Millgram’s main theme of hyperspecialization is a lens through which to regard a whole range of 
distinct philosophical topics, and our article is an attempt to unify these disparate stories, which 
is a challenge given the diversity of the areas covered. A core theme, though, is the isolation of 
specialist communities.  There is some reason to think that specialist communities are not 
completely isolated, conceptually speaking.  The knowledge of the quantum physicist, labelled 
‘subtle’ by Nguyen (forthcoming) as not obviously connected with everyday experience, is 
understood by the semiconductor electronics specialist whose understanding in turn is familiar to 
the computer hardware specialist which leads to machines we are familiar with and know work, 
most of the time.  Nguyen draws our attention to those links among scientific specializations, 
referring to Kitcher’s (1993) notion of indirect calibration.  To support or oppose that case more 
thoroughly would require testimony from those specialists in those linking locations.  This point 
softens the force of the claim Millgram makes about barriers between professions and disciplines 
without necessarily removing the significance of the main idea. 
 
There are attempts in scientific, engineering and policy contexts to overcome problems of 
intellectual isolation, by fostering interdisciplinary study and work, and the creation of 
interdisciplinary teams to investigate important social and technical issues.  For example, Michael 
O’Rourke and Stephen Crowley, as well as their colleagues in the health sciences, have suggested 
that our philosophical training can improve communication across disciplines (Schnapp, et al., 
2012; O’Rourke and Crowley 2013).  Their Toolbox Project attempts to effect epistemic changes 
that lead to better comprehension by members of distinct scientific endeavors.  That there are 
such attempts to remove or mitigate the kind of intellectual isolation does not automatically 
mean they are successful.   
 
There is a profession that has a vested interest in the removal of intellectual isolationism.  
Scientists writing for a general audience, such as Stephen Hawking (1998), purport to remove the 
isolation not only between scientist and the non-scientist but between cosmologist and molecular 
biologist.  Even if the author is a genuine expert and perspicuous writer, like Hawking, the truth 
is that even a molecular biologist may have difficulty fully comprehending Hawking’s work.  
Hawking, like any expert, is isolated from non-experts and experts in other nearby fields.  The 
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merit of Millgram’s claim does not depend on some artificial thesis of complete intellectual 
isolation, such as what may be experienced between the expert and novices.  The significance of 
hyperspecialization can rest on a significant degree of mutual incomprehensibility amongst 
different specialists under the broad umbrella of science.  
 
We have discussed Millgram’s claim that humans have the capacity for being serial 
hyperspecializers, a capacity that is highly relevant to the modern world with its quickly changing 
employment market, often requiring a person to move from one specialist career to another 
perhaps several times during her life.  What of the complementary notion of being a parallel 
hyperspecializer in which a person engages in different specialist interests during one period of 
their life?  In fact, there is a place (Millgram 2015, 64-65) where Millgram discusses precisely that 
and later mentions presumably the same notion under the label “the synchronic disunity of 
agency” (Millgram 2015, 262).  He speaks (Millgram 2015, 64) of a person who divides her time 
among being a medical journalist, an avant-garde installation artist and an owner of a country 
home in a small town.  His point is that the standards and expectations of the three activities are 
incommensurable and, therefore, there is no guidance from any of those fields as to how to 
make tradeoffs among the demands of those three activities.   
 
The idea of parallel hyperspecialization is powerful as it connects with important and familiar 
features of life in modern society but this is merely mentioned in passing in the volume.  Under 
the heading of serial hyperspecialization, Millgram points to a kind of incommensurability 
between the mind-sets the person needs to adopt before and after the shift to a new 
specialization.  Parallel hyperspecialization concerns an incommensurability between the different 
mind-sets associated with the specialisms contained within a single individual at the same period 
of life.  It challenges common assumptions about the unity of the self.  
 
We hold that there are indeed cases where different specialist mind-sets are contained within an 
individual at one period of life and the common embodiment does not automatically remove the 
incommensurability.  Compare two physicists who are also golfers.  For one, her knowledge of 
the physics of hitting golf balls and the effect of humidity, wind and other factors is well 
integrated into how she approaches her game.  That is not to say she performs precise 
calculations but in making estimates she thinks in the concepts of physics.  The other physicist, 
while on the golf course, needs to shut off his mind from his physics knowledge, at least at a 
technical level, and needs to think in the terms supplied by his coach.  He can’t translate ideas 
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between the two spheres.  It seems to us that the second scenario is possible, and maybe even 
quite common, and maybe for certain specialties is close to inevitable. 
 
We have discussed elsewhere a thesis of the disunity of the self that echoes Millgram’s thesis of 
segmented agency, though emphasizing parallel rather than serial hyperspecialization (Lumsden 
and Ulatowski 2017).  Our framework was a narrative account of the self and thus our 
articulation of the disunity of self was that there is likely to be no overarching narrative unity to 
the self, either at a time or through time.  Rather, there will be persisting narrative threads that 
bump up against each other and interact only to some extent.  Leaving the narrative approach to 
one side, we wish to emphasize the parallel hyperspecialization thesis that is undeveloped in 
Millgram’s volume.  We consider that to be a logical next step.  When we think of a specialist, we 
think of someone with the authority of a deep understanding of their special field.  Millgram 
refines that picture by allowing that the specialist can change careers, which gives us serial 
hyperspecialization.  We can move a step further and accept multiple specialisms captured 
simultaneously in one body, but where there is a disconnect between the two understandings. 
We consider that step to be an important move in bringing to the fore an important question 
concerning the nature of the self, that is, to what extent should we expect an overarching unity 
to the self, both at a time and through time? 
 
8. Conclusion 
In this discussion, we have critically examined Millgram’s notion of hyperspecialization, including 
a salient form, serial hyperspecialization, which is central to The Great Endarkenment.  We have 
shown how hyperspecialization takes different forms in different contexts and explained how 
this is consistent with Millgram’s methodological approach.  He says we should not attempt a 
semantic analysis of a notion but rather see how it makes reasoning about the world effective.  
What makes for effective reasoning will vary from situation to situation.  We touched on two 
areas to which the notion of hyperspecialization is applied: morality and necessity.  We wish to 
recommend these ideas as providing a useful lens through which to view a range of philosophical 
issues.  We have noted that Millgram’s central thesis of hyperspecialization need not depend on 
complete and total isolation between specializations.  Further, we urge more attention be given 
to the theme of parallel hyperspecialization, where different specialisms occur concurrently in 
one body. 
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